Abstract
Introduction
Fraud has progressed from being perpetrated by off-the-cuff impostors to being perpetrated by well thought-out delinquency and racket rings that utilize urbane ways and means to invade bank accounts and syphon the monies. The biggest challenge lies with the banking sector that should provide sufficient security and safety to customers' finances. Furthermore, with the advent of the global economy, electronic commerce is fast being regarded as the way to go global at the touch of a button (Ladan, 2003) . As a result, developing countries and emerging economies are progressively transiting from cash to an electronic based economy by virtue of cashless policy implementation (Enoch, 2013) . According to Dlamini & Modise (2012) South Africa remains one of top three countries that are beleaguered by phishing attacks; the other two are the US and the UK (RSA, 2011). As a response in South Africa, various entities engage in cyber security awareness initiatives and trainings with the aim to create cyber security awareness among the citizens of South Africa.
It is considered that financial institutions face unique challenges in fighting identity theft and fraud where the customer is the source of information 'breach' innocently or providing the tools needed by fraudsters to commit their crimes (Hinde, 2005) . Electronic commerce relies on give-and-take of information between transaction partners over networks, often the Internet, and as such there are always security risks since messages could be stolen, lost, or modified. It is thus crucial to manage Web Services security efficaciously and dependably (Wang, 2010) . To that end, Osford Ogis (2012) suggested that it is imperative to introduce new technologies to fight internet fraud coupled with adequate awareness on security as internet fraud ranges from stolen credit cards used to purchase goods, to fake web sites, and click fraud in advertising.
The problem of online and electronic bank security and safety is much pronounced in the financial sector where the compromises are more sophisticated than in other industries (Joyner, 2011) . In an endeavor to tackle online and electronic security, many countries have drafted policies, education and awareness crusades and training programmes. Through this philosophy, amongst its inhabitants, the South African government visualizes safer and more secure cyber-citizens (Kortjan & Solms, 2012) . In particular, according to Fick (2009) governments and the banking sector, should work together to ensure the development of strong sharing of information that will enhance security, and to support the security education and awareness of citizens.
Open security and safety awareness raised for by banks on their websites affords valuable information to online and electronic customers. Many of the methods that cybercriminals employ take advantage of the customer's lack of knowledge, and specifically, their failure to appreciate the risks associated with accessing the internet and responding to unsolicited emails (ACI, 2013) . In support to that Barret (2011) cited that it is clear, from a variety of sources, that most consumers have little idea how to protect themselves online. There are many studies that show the middle-of-the-road internet users are both afraid of the risk of using the internet, and simultaneously don't have the information needed to protect them online. In comparison with some of their international counterparts, there is still much that South Africa can do to effectively raise public awareness regarding cyber-crime (Fick, 2009 ). Consumer awareness and information distribution seem to be the keystones of these determinations.
Although researches have been done on online and electronic fraud the author found no research that specifically addressed fraud prevention and safety tips awareness in the banking sector. In light of the above background, the paper aims to examine the extent of online and electronic banking fraud prevention and safety tips awareness in South African banking sector.
The following sections of this paper outline the literature review, theoretical framework, methodology, findings and discussions, and conclusion.
Literature Review
Online and electronic fraud cannot be exterminated, but can be managed like any other risks. Online and electronic crime or cyber-crime refers to any crime that involves a computer (Ionesco & Blajan, 2011) , electronic or digital gadget and a network. Online and electronic networking delivers many benefits, but it is also associated with security pressures and modifies the organization's complete information security menace profile. Even though execution of high-tech solutions is the common retort to online and electronic security threats and susceptibilities, online and electronic security and safety is principally a bank management concern to provide awareness to consumers. According to Choi et al. (2008) effective management of the threats and attacks connected with online technology requires a sound and thorough assessment of risk given the environment and development of a plan to mitigate identified threats.
The fast growth of network communication leads to the expansion of information technology which in turn leads to the influence of access control system in banking sectors which navigates in to the deep of network security the most essential scenario of everyday life (Perumal, 2008) . Accordingly the financial institutions need to keep the clients' awareness base conversant on any latest perils that they are likely to encounter. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (2011) & Indiana Bankers Association (2012) support that financial institutions' customer awareness and educational efforts should address protections provided and not provided in relation to online fraud and other alternative security risk control mechanisms.
Many of the cyber fraud risks allied to identity theft can be moderated by the development and application of rigorous policies including consumer education and awareness, systems and strategies. Those risks that flow from the affected individual must be managed using available tools and products that both support the individual and protect the employer, whilst in the nonexistence of a firm risk management plan for identity theft, the potential losses are virtually limitless (Deybach, 2007) . Some criminologists have examined this type of fraud, by exploring the mechanisms employed by scammers through a qualitative analysis of 412 fraudulent e-mail messages. The findings demonstrate that multiple writing techniques are used to generate responses and personal information from victims (Holt & Graves, 2007) . Mostly bank consumers are concerned about identity theft and wonder if the internet is safe for online banking. However, if financial institutions and customers cooperate, they can make it safe (BITS, 2003), hence enlightening customers to be aware of the scams to which they are vulnerable is one of the most effective means to dissuade identity theft.
According Perumal (2008) a larger percentage of phishing attacks specifically involves attempts to rob customers of financial services companies. Concurring to Perumal, Joyner (2011) posits that in a Gartner Research 2008 survey of 50 banks, more than half reported that their institutions had been the target of a phishing attack. More so, the phenomenon of advance fee fraud schemes, or more commonly referred to as 419 scams, have been widely reported on in South Africa (Fick, 2009 ). Therefore
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Online & electronic fraud prevention & safety tips cognizance in South African banks strengthening awareness programs to help customers avoid online scams such as phishing, pharming, and mobile scams such as smshing and vishing, that can lead to account hijacking and other identity theft forms can take necessary action to limit the liability (FDIC, 2004) .
Furthermore, as customers become more sophisticated, it becomes crucial for the banks to consider the use of technology and awareness efforts to respond to their continuously changing requirements. Mobarek (2007) after conducting a research, it was clearly seen that delivery channels were lacking in meeting the demands of the customer by not making them aware of e-banking and using obsolete or not too up-todate technology. According to Fick (2009) South Africa have seen a sharp increase over the last few years prior to 2009 in the commission of online and electronic banking fraud and the potential loss for the government and banking sector proved to be significant. The users' identifications and passwords were in turn stolen by means of hardware key loggers and spy software that were installed on certain computers. Sixteen percent of the cybercrime victims were affected through their phones compared to only 10 percent globally and malware and computer viruses made up the biggest portion of cybercrime in South Africa as scams and phishing fraud made up the rest (Grobler et al 2013) .
Consumer education and awareness by financial institutions is critical in decreasing fraud losses and to preventing internet fraud as most individuals will take action if they believe it will decrease their chances of being victimized by fraud, as long as the action does not significantly inconvenience the customers (BITS, 2003). Organized crime groups, cyber gangs, and other criminals breach systems to steal funds via account takeovers, ATM heists, and other mechanisms (Cuomo & Lawsky, 2014). These have made the growing perception that the internet is rife with credit card fraud and security hazards, and this has been a serious problem for e-commerce (Aseef et al, 2005 ).
According to Joyner (2011) card fraud is not a domestic product, it is everywhere -for example, card fraud losses costed the UK economy GBP 423 million (US$767 million) in 2006; credit card fraud accounts for the biggest cut of the $600 million that airlines lose each year globally, according to Deloitte research, and card losses top ZAR 50 million a year in South Africa (US$6.3 million), according to the South African Card Fraud Forum. In addition to that, an estimated £139.6 million of card fraud took place over the internet in 2011, an increase of 3 per cent from 2010 when e-commerce fraud losses were £135.1 million. Internet fraud accounted for 63 per cent of card-not-present losses -slightly up from 59 per cent in 2010 (Financial Fraud Action, 2012).Therefore an increased public awareness of victimization risks and protective measures that can be taken represents an important strategy in the prevention of online and electronic crime type (United Nations, 2013) especially in South African banking sector.
Theoretical framework
This paper is premised on rational choice (or Situational) theory. It arose in the mid-eighteenth century and was developed by the classical school of criminology through the writings of Cesare Beccaria and Jeremy Bentham. It perceives people as free agents who are able to make rational choices nearly in all facets of life (Lyman & Potter 2007) . The evolution and infiltration of computer technology in up-to-the-minute life has provided criminals with efficient tools to commit crime by providing opportunities to perpetrate crimes that could not occur without cyberspace (Bossler & Holt, 2009; Lowman, 2010) . Therefore, according to Geason & Wilson (1988) the decision to commit the crime is made in response to the immediate circumstances and the instant situation in which an offence is envisaged; and the motivation to offend is not constant or beyond control. Failure by the banking sector to provide awareness on online and electronic fraud prevention and safety tips creates opportunities for the cyber fraudsters to attack bank customers. Situational crime prevention ways and means (banks' website awareness method) target to lessen a varied assortment of crimes. Even though organisations can use a diversity of profiling structures to aid spot any wary activity, numerous organisations seems to lack fundamental prevention techniques that can halt many planned or opportunistic bouts. According to Lowman (2010) ensuring an organizational culture of online and electronic security awareness and observance would not only help prevent this, but may additionally make attackers think twice before committing a crime.
Methodology
The sampling frame for this study was made up of 16 (sixteen) locally controlled and foreign controlled banks, on the list that contains the up-to-date information available to the Bank Supervision Department of the South African Reserve Bank in terms of the provisions of the Banks Act, 1990. A sample size of 13 (thirteen) banks was used and the banks were arbitrarily chosen on the basis of website ease of access. A qualitative content analysis research technique was used for exploration of the text content data through the logical taxonomy process of coding and classifying themes or patterns (du Plooy-Cilliers, 2014) to offer a thorough considerate of online and electronic banking fraud prevention and safety tips in the banking sector. Information on online and electronic banking fraud prevention tips awareness was salvaged from each bank's website and precisely from the security centre and link section or otherwise. Coding progression was done on the salvaged manuscripts marking sections of data under category -prevention tips and the codes were represented by different online and electronic fraud prevention tips and the variables were represented by bank, case and location. The statistical analysis was done using frequencies, cluster analysis, cooccurrences, similarity matrices, and crosstab matrix. To further envisage the presentation of the outcomes bar charts and dendrograms (tree graphs) were used.
Data source
The list of the banks and their websites used as the sample size was retrieved from the Reserve Bank of South Africa's website (accessed 15 April 2015), https://www.resbank.co.za/RegulationAndSupervision/BankSupervision/Pages/SouthAfr icanRegisteredBanksAndRepresentativeOffices.aspx. The pertinent data (online and electronic banking fraud prevention tips awareness) for analysis was subsequently copied from each bank's website and mostly from security centre link and/or other website sections.
Findings and discussions
The coding frequencies list from Table 1 below displays online and electronic fraud prevention tips along with their description and category to which they belong. The list was used to get statistics for each fraud prevention tip, and the number of cases in which they are found. The findings show that phishing prevention tips have the highest case frequency of 71.40% from 10 cases. This implies that it has been disclosed by many South Afric Online banking fraud safety tips have the highest code frequency of 12.20% disclosed in 9 cases with a case frequency of 64.30%. ATM, debit card, credit card and scam fraud safety tips have 50% case frequency each disclosed in 7 cases. Pharming f frequency of 7.10% disclosed in a single case followed by business fraud safety tips, SIM card swopping and cash send fraud safety tips with 14.30% each disclosed in 2 cases each. Spam, smshing and vishing have 21.40% c visual display the bar chart below (Fig. 1) exhibits the relative frequencies of online and electronic fraud prevention and safety tips awareness. Table - 
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The coding frequencies list from Table 1 below displays online and electronic fraud prevention tips along with their description and category to which they belong. The list was statistics for each fraud prevention tip, and the number of cases in which they are found. The findings show that phishing prevention tips have the highest case frequency of 71.40% from 10 cases. This implies that it has been disclosed by many South African banks. Online banking fraud safety tips have the highest code frequency of 12.20% disclosed in 9 cases with a case frequency of 64.30%. ATM, debit card, credit card and scam fraud safety tips have raud safety tips has the lowest case frequency of 7.10% disclosed in a single case followed by business fraud safety tips, SIM card swopping and cash send fraud safety tips with 14.30% each disclosed in 2 cases each. Spam, ase frequency each disclosed in 3 cases each. For further visual display the bar chart below (Fig. 1) exhibits the relative frequencies of online and 1. Online and electronic banking fraud prevention tips awareness frequencies Online and electronic banking fraud prevention tips awareness co-occurrence (similarity matrix and cluster analysis using similarity index) (Using Ochiai's coefficient -This index is the binary form of the cosine measure and the formula is SQRT(a^2/((a+b)(a+c))), where a represents cases where both items occur, and b and c represent cases where one item is present but not the other one).
Online and electronic banking fraud prevention tips frequencies
An average-linkage hierarchical clustering technique using a Dendrogram (Fig.  2) beneath illustrates clusters of online and electronic banking fraud prevention tips awareness from a similarity matrix (Table 2) . In this Dendrogram, the vertical axis is made up of the online and electronic banking fraud prevention tips, and the horizontal axis epitomizes the clusters designed at each stage of the clustering process. Credit card and debit card fraud prevention tips form a cluster with the highest co-efficient of 1 followed by online banking and phishing fraud tips cluster with a co-efficient of 0.727 and key logging and scam fraud prevention tips cluster with 0.714 co-efficient. These clusters depict fraud types that tend to appear together and occur more often. At the end of the agglomeration are the combination of online and electronic banking fraud prevention tips awareness that are independent from one another or those that do not appear together (business fraud and identity theft, spam and SIM card swopping, identity theft and cash send) with co-efficient of 0 each. SIM card swopping and vishing has a cluster with a co-efficient of 0.2. From the Dendrogram 8 clusters have a coefficient of 0.5 and above each whilst 7 clusters have a co-efficient of less than 0.5, which implies that there is restrained co-occurrence similarity. 
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Figure -2. Online and electronic banking fraud prevention tips awareness -Dendrogram
Online and electronic banking fraud prevention tips awareness-similarity matrix The Figure 3 below shows clustering performed on cases (banks), the distance matrix used for clustering consists of cosine coefficients computed on the relative frequency of the various online and electronic banking fraud prevention tips awareness. The more alike two cases will be in terms of the dispersal of codes, the higher will be the co-efficient. From Figure 3 and Table 3 below, Bank 4 and Bank 7 have a cluster with the highest co-efficient of 0.913 followed by clusters of Bank 5 and Bank 6, and Bank 8 and Bank 6 with 0.88 and 0.875 co-efficient respectively. This means that the 3 banks have more related online and electronic banking fraud prevention tips awareness distribution on their website security centres or otherwise. The last cluster with the lowest co-efficient of 0.291 is combination of Bank 13 and Bank 3. Table - 
Figure -3. Online and electronic banking fraud prevention tips awarenessDendrogram similarity index
Online and electronic banking fraud prevention tips awareness -crosstab matrix The dialog box Table 4 below explores the relationship between online and electronic banking fraud prevention tips awareness distribution disclosed on banks' websites and subgroups of cases defined by values of categorical variable. The table counts the total number of times online and electronic banking fraud prevention tip has been disclosed across the banking sector. The results show that Bank 7 has the highest code frequencies of online and electronic banking fraud prevention tips awareness followed by Bank 1, Bank 6, Bank 11, Bank 9, Bank 5 and Bank 13 in that order. The least code frequencies in cases were recorded in Banks 2 and 8 which disclosed only one prevention tip each followed by Bank 3 which has disclosure of only 2 tips and Bank 12 with 3 tips.
The findings also conclude that there is no statistically significant correlation between variables given that most of the P values are greater than 0.05 as shown in Table 4 below. This means increases or decreases in online and electronic banking fraud prevention tips awareness do not significantly relate to increases or decreases in cases. Also Pearson's r is negative (negative correlation) for more than half of the online and electronic banking fraud prevention tips. This means that as online and electronic banking fraud prevention tips awareness increases in value, the cases decrease in value and also the positive Pearson's r co-efficient are not closer to 1 and concludes that there is no stronger correlation between the variables.
The results suggest that the disclosure of online and electronic banking fraud prevention tips awareness is low in many South African banks as is shown in the results above. This suggests that most of the clients engage online and electronic dealings without sufficient awareness on online and electronic banking fraud risks. Consequently there is a very great chance of being targets of cyber banking fraudsters. Table - The findings of this paper therefore concur with results from a study carried by Grobler et al (2011) . They found that in Limpopo province of South Africa, cyber security awareness level is relatively low, and that there is a dire need for urgent awareness. Also similar conclusion was given by Kritzinger and Solms, (2012) that this is a very risky situation and means therefore that there is a clear, but certainly not deliberate lack of cyber security awareness and education to make cyber users aware of all possible cyber threats and risks.
However, the findings of this paper conflicts with the results from Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (2004)'s study in US that financial institutions are communicating directly with consumers to make them more aware of identity theft and phishing attacks and offering customers the means to report attacks quickly. FDIC staff reviewed the Web sites of several of the nation's largest banks and found that banks are displaying the explanation of protections provided and not provided for online activities and alternative risk mechanisms.
Similarly, Hutchings and Hayes (2009) found that the websites of Australia's four main banks, namely the Commonwealth Bank of Australia, the National Australia Bank, Westpac and ANZ, were perused to identify how they advised their clients online about phishing attacks. All of these banking websites cautioned against accessing internet banking facilities from a link within an email, as well as recommending the use of email filters, providing hints on how to identify whether a website was authentic, and advising of procedures for reporting hoax emails.
Conclusion and Recommendations
The findings conclude that rational choice (or situational) theory strains the point that bank customers can realize a high notch of online and electronic fraud prevention by concentrating on the situational facets that effect specific criminal conduct. According to rational choice theory, a fraudster reasonably selects both the fraud type to perpetrate and the target of the crime, who is the customers. The benefits of a cyberfraudster seem high as it may look there is diminutive chance of being trapped. Notwithstanding fraudster stimulus, elimination of that opportunity via fraud prevention and safety awareness will shrink the frequency of online and electronic crime in the banking sector.
Moreover, from the findings it is concluded that disclosure of information relating specifically to online and electronic banking security and safety awareness must be understood within full public disclosure on banks' websites and by placing notices on their websites. By getting customers participating in the battle against online and electronic fraud prevention, and making them cognizant of what is or is not anticipated of the customer when it comes to sharing data and communicating with them, banks put some of the control back in customers' hands to thwart online fraud losses. This would convey a vibrant communication that combating online and electronic fraud involves corporation between the financial institutions and its customers. Also enlightening the customer on how to aid avert online banking fraud is just one constituent of a bank's fraud defenses to cyber threats and attacks.
Although online and electronic banking fraud prevention awareness and educational efforts that are stirring currently are noble, they are modestly not at the standard desirable to relief hundreds of millions of internet customers. This area requests considerably increased investment from the banking industry. 
